This paper is a product of the "Changing Domestic Priorities" project which has examined the shifts taking place in the nation's economic and social policies under the Reagan Administration and is now focusing on the major economic and social problems facing the nation over the coming decade. The topics are discussed in this paper: (1) trends in black economic progress; (2) how these trends may have contributed to the development of an underclass; (3) new estimate's of the size and growth of the underclass in a nontechnical way; and (4) the implications of these trends for policies aimed at reducing some of the remaining disparities between blacks and whites and assisting the most severely disadvantaged blacks. Three tables, three figures, and 41 references are included. (JS) 
Introduction
Widely reported earnings increases for black men (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1986 and Smith and Welch, 1986 ) and the emergence of a "new black middle class" (Wilson, 1978; Simms, 1986; and Landry, 1987) . document progress over the last twenty years during which efforts.to reduce racial economic inequality have waned. Nevertheless, the enigmatic black ghetto remains with us and its distressing features have taken on alarming proportions (e.g., crime, childbearing by teenagers, welfare dependency, dropping out of high school, male joblessness, drug abuse, and AIDS).
The recent focus on a population called the "underclass" has emerged from the coincidence of these social ills in the nation's largest urban areas (Rainwater, 1981; Auletta, 1982; Lehman, 1986; Nathan, 1986; and Wilson, 1987) . This paper briefly reviews trends in black economic progress, discusses how these trends may have contributed to the development of an underclass, presents new estimates of the size and growth of the underclass in a non-technical way, and discusses the implications of these trends for policies aimed at reducing some of the remaining disparities between blacks and whites and assisting the most severely disadvantaged blacks.
Progress in Black Family and Personal Incomes
To assess progress in black family incomes Table 1 shows the ratio of black median family income to white median family income for selected years since 1955. As the table makes clear, the progress that was made -2 Thus, the ratio of black median family income to white median family income was 55 percent in 1965, one year following the Civil Rights Acts. By 1987 it had risen by a mere percentage point.
The economy's role in the deterioration of relative black family incomes is clear from data on the black employment-to-population ratio relative to the white employment-to-population ratio (hereafter, relative employment-to-population ratio).1 To relate these data to the overall performance of the labor market, the unemployment rate for all workers is superimposed on the same figure.2
Sustained periods of law and falling unemployment slowed the long term decline in the employment position of blacks relative to the corresponding position of whites. During the tight labor market of the sixties (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) , the male relative employment-to-population ratio actually rose to its initial value of 0.94, while the female employmentto-population ratio declined very rapidly. After 1975, when the unemployment rate rose, blacks of both genders were less likely to be employed than whites. Therefore, tight labor markets affected their relative employment positions in the same way. For example, the relative male and female employment-to-population ratios both improved during the 1. Data on labor force characteristics of nonwhites and whites are available from the 1940's, but separate data frr blacks compiled until 1972. Thus, Figure 1 shows the nonwhite /white employment-to-population ratios from 1955 to 1971 and black/white employment-to-population ratios from 1972 to 1987.
2. The three lines in the figure are reconciled by noting that the scale for the two ratios--nonwhite (or black)/white male employment-topopulation ratio and nonwhite (or black)/white female employment-topopulation ratio is on the left, while the scale for the overall unemployment rate is on the right. Ratio of Nonwhite (or Black) to White Employment to Population Ratios by Sex, 1955 Sex, -1987 Ratio of Nonwhite to White
Total Unemployment Rate The left axis corresponds to the employment population ratios, the right axis corresponds to the unemployment rates.
recent recovery (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) . Dim prospects for a continued economic recovery into the 1990's suggest that black employment prospects will continue to deteriorate throughout the coming decade.
Well educated blacks, who represent a small but increasing fraction of the black population, have reaped greater benefits from economic recovery than others and may be less vulnerable to recessions.
Throughout the 1980's, for example, black male college graduates ;Jetween 20 and 29 years old have had full-year employment-to-population ratios more than twice as high as black high school dropouts of the same age and average earnings almost two and one-half times the average earnings of black high school graduates (Sum and Fogg, 1988) .
Gender differences in the growth of black personal incomes and changes in family structure also helped to reverse earlier progress in black family incomes.
In contrast to median family income, Figure 2 shows a fairly steady upward trend in the ratio of black male median income to white male median income between 1955 and 1970, much slower progress between 1970 and 1975 , and almost no change thereafter. Thus, in 196J median black male income was 53 percent of the white median male income and by 1985 it was almost 63 percent of the white male median income. Although the black female-white male median income ratio has been lower than the black male-white male median income ratio, the former has improved much more rapidly.3 Further, the former, unlike the latter, has contirmrd improve during the 1980's.
3. While it may seem more natural to compare incomes of black females to those of white females, such a compc,;son ignores the higher labor force participation rates of black women and their increasingly important role as family heads. Sawhill, 1975; Becker, 1981; and Espenshade, 1985) . If black male incomes had risen faster than black female incomes, changes in family structure might have been less severe.5
Thus, black family structure changes, which sparked such controversy after being highlighted by Moynihan, 1965 , were a major reason that black personal income gains were not easily translated into black family income gains. As Table 2 shows, female-headed families have become a significant and steadily increasing share of all black families. These families have had much lower median incomes relative to white families (Table 3) and much higher poverty rates ( Figure 3 ). Clearly this point would have been better illustrated by data on wages or earnings, rather than inrnme. Whit,: hannfor rAvm.1,1Li weaken the connection between income and earnings for blacks somewhat, the value of inteTest earning assets held by blacks is extremely low (Tidwell, 1988) . For these reasons, income is probably a good indicator of earnings for black persons and black families.
5.
This is not meant to imply that blacks would have been better off if black female wages remained low. On the contrary, the greater increases in black female earnings is partly attributable to greater investments, relative to blaci. males, in education (Farley, 1984) . The male-headed figure was derived by subtracting husband-wife and female-headed family percentages from 100 percent.
b.
Data for 1964 was obtained from the CPS Series P-23, No. 80 which does not provide any significant digits after the decimal. Poverty Rates by Race'ind Family Structure, Selected Years, 1960 Male-headed includes all male-headed families with wife present and wife not present.
a.
since. In part this reflects a change in the characteristics of women heading such families. Prior to 1980-81, most of the growth in black female-headed families involved women with at least a high school education, many of whom were separated or divorced. More recently, the growth has been among never married women and has involved more out-ofwedlock births (Hill, 1986 and Simms, 1986 Freeman (1973) found that EEOC expenditures per nonwhite worker significantly increased the relative income of black workers. Also, Farley (1984) found declining black-white disparities in rates of return on investments in education, training, and migration.
While this is strong evidence that discrimination has declined, blacks continue to earn less than similarly qualified whites.
Some observers fear that affirmative action in hiring increased disparities within the black community. This could occur if affirmative action gave employers incentives to hire those blacks with the most work experience or education because subsequent promotions for these blacks were easiest to justify. Employers may also have hired hlaci!s f-r ''rr'r level positions and avoided hiring blacks for lower level positions because such hiring policies would weight the distribution of total black employmenttoward the higher end of the occupational distribution. (U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, 1986).
Besides employment discrimination, housing eiscrimination was an important target of civil rights activity. Housing segregation is a very important indicator of socio-economic progress, because housing represents consumption of a package of goods and services--including the cleanliness of the neighborhood, the probability of becoming a victim of violence or burglary, the quality of schools, and so on--and inc ,es in the quantity and quality of goods and services should follow incre...,es in employment and earnings.6
Most studies of housing segregation (McKinney and Schnare, 1986; Farley and Wilger, 1987) agree that segregation of blacks from whites has declined since the civil rights era and that the pace of desegregation quickened after the Open Housing Act took effect in 1970. Some studies suggest that blacks with higher levels of income and education are less segregated from whites than other blacks. Other studies (see Farley and Wilger, 1987; and Farley and Allen, 1987) find similar patterns of segregation of blacks from whites, regardless of their income or level of education. 
Trends in the Size and Composition of the Underclass
While there is no single definition of the 1.:-darclass, discussions (Rainwater, 1981; Auletta, 1982; Lehman, 1986; Nathan, 1986; and Wilson, 1987) emphasize that the group is composed of residents of spatially isolated neighborhoods, many of whom exhibit behavior outside the mainstream (e.g., crime, welfare dependency, childbearing by teenagers, male joblessness, and dropping out of high school). Because its neighborhoods are spatially isolated and have high rates of social problems, the underclass is also socially isolated from the rest of urban society. Finally, most observers believe that the underclass consists primarily of blacks in ghetto neighborhoods of older industrial cities in the Northeast and North Central regions and most accounts cuari^v """' the group has grown rapidly in recent years.
Researchers at The Urban Institute have recently developed an
empirical definition called an underclass area, estimated the size of the population living in such areas, and analyzed trends in the composition and growth of this population. According to Ricketts and Sawhill (1988) an "underclass areas" is a census tract with extremely high rates of welfare dependency, male detachment from the labor force, dropping out of high school, and femaleheaded households.? This definition is very restrictive because a tract must score extremely high on all four indicatots to be counted among underclass areas. The second underclass study, Ricketts and Mincy (1988) Two features of the underclass area definition deserve emphasis.
First, while others (Wilson, 1987; Bane and Jargowsky, 1988; Clark and Nathan, 1982) to almost 300 thousand in 1980. These results provide further evidence of the relationship between male labor force detachment and female-headed families, which is key to the remedies discussed below.
8.
While it is true that residence within an SMSA is not among the Ricketts and Sawhill underclass criteria, both studies use Census data for tracted areas only. Since 93-94 percent of the population within tracted areas resides within SMSA's, rural populations were underepresented in their sample.
Policy Priorities
More effective anti-discrimination and affirmative action policies top the list of popular remedies for racial economic inequality, just as welfare reform tops the list of popular remedies for the underclass. As we have seen, however, neither goal will be achieved until three intermediate conditions are met: (1) higher employment and (2) higher wages, especially among low-skilled black men, and (3) more black families with two earners. The popular remedies are not the best tools for achieving these intermediate conditions.
Since wage and employment discrimination still exists (see Ellwood, 1986 and Leonard, 1986) , affirmation action and continued enforcement of anti-discrimination laws are needed; however, these policies may have little effect on blacks in underclass areas. Those who lack jobs will not benefit from equal pay protection or from affirmative action in promotion. Since so many are high school dropouts, affirmative action in hiring can open up the lowest paid positions at best. At worst, it can cause employers to discriminate against blacks from underclass areas to avoid skewing the distribution of black employment toward low paying jobs.
Continuing to emphasize the goal of reducing discrimination seems unwise because other factors could explain pervasive joblessness in underclass areas. These include: the decline in manufacturing employment in urban areas; the increase in service sector employment rorptir;rvi workers with more than a high school diploma (Kasarda, 1988 and Vroman, 1987) ; and the reluctance of low skilled urban blacks to accept jobs in the growing, but low paying, service and retail sectors (Mead, 1986 and Murray, 1984) . These explanations leave little hope that government canproduce high paying jobs for low-skilled workers. Further, past manpower programs increased earnings for low-skilled workers primarily by increasing their work effort, rather than increasing their wage rates.
Thus, program benefits for adult men have been lower than benefits for younger workers, new labor force entrants, re-entrants and women (Burtless, 1984) .
These program benefits are related to the recent welfare reform legislation, the most popular remedy for the underclass. Like manpower programs, the greatest earnings gains from recent state, work-welfare;
experiments have come by increasing work efforts by single mothers, through employment services such as job-training, job search, childcare and employment counseling (Gueron, 1987) . The 1988 Family Security Act requires all states to develop similar programs, but because these programs rarely apply to absent fathers--the typical case in underclass areas--they will leave half of the underclass problem untouched. Under welfare reform, single mothers will provide support for their children through in-kind services. If they find a job, they will also provide.
cash support. But absent fathers, who are unwilling take a job, bear no responsibility for their children and those who are willing to work, but are unable to find employment or earn enough, will receive no help in meeting their paternal obligations. Since a rising share of femaleheaded families has been partly responsible for rising black poverty rates and 60 percent of households in underclass areas are a1 s,, hr,1-1 by females, this approach is seriously flawed.
Future policy must compliment work-welfare programs by (1) reducing joblessness among men in underclass areas and (2) making sure that absent fathers in underclass areas support their children. Increasing demand for low-skilled workers in urban areas or providing public service employment at low wages could accomplish the first goal. If successful, such programs would stabilize labor force participation patterns among men in underclass areas, allow them to establish employment records, and make it possible for those who father children to share the responsibility with mothers and with taxpayers.
This leaves the problem of low pay unresolved, but by joining the ranks of the working poor, the underclass aria population would become part of a large and growing constituency whose plight will receive positive action because it receives much more public sympathy and is much easier to understand. It would benefit from policies such as increases in the minimum wage, expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, expansion in mandated employee benefits and so on, which rank second to none in importance among domestic policy issues (Sawhill, in American Agenda, 1988) .
Establishing paternity and support orders, even when fathers are poor or unemployed, and tying employment services for absent fathers to child support payments could achieve the second goal. The Family Security Act already contains the foundations of this proposal.
Further, even though poor, young, black fathers, rarely merry the mothers of their children, Lerman (1986) provides some evidence that they make small cash and in kind child support contributions. This leaves room for optimism that, if government can increase and stabilize thoir earnings, som absent fathers in underclass areas will make higher and more stable contributions to their children.' Finally, while purely punitive measures could backfire, establishing paternity and a legal obligation to support could discourage absent fatherhood.
Summary
Although progress slowed after 1972-73, a buoyant economy, reductions in employment discrimination, and affirmative action in hiring improved employment and earnings prospects for blacks. In particular, these changes enabled well educated blacks to increase their employmert and earnings advantages over other blacks. Since black women have has relatively high employment-to-population ratios, blacks who remained in married couple families were much less likely to become poor than those experiencing divorce, separation, or those who never married. As a result, income inequality among blacks has increased (see Sum and Fogg, 1988) . Finally, the Open Housing Act facilitated the exodus of some professional or well-educated blacks, but many other blacks remained concentrated within ghetto areas whee poverty rates are extremely high.
These trends could explain the economic polarization of the black community and the emergence and growth of the underclass in recent years.
Using a spatial and behavioral approach, researchers have identified a small but growing population beset by the social ills common to descriptions of the underclass. This population is primarily, though not exclusively black, and lives primarily in large urban areas in the Northeast and North Central regions, amidst concentrations of low skilled men detached from the labor force, low skilled women heading families and depending on welfare, and teenagers whose high school dropout rates make their, future prospects look just as bleak.
Although reducing racial economic inequality is still the prinlry goal, solutions must recognize and incorporate socio-economic disparities among blacks. Besides policies to protect employed and experienced blacks from wage and employment discrimination and policies designed to give thcm preferential access to better jobs, policies must also increase employment and earnings of low-skilled blacks, especially black men.
Policies 4ast also increase child support payments by absent black fathers to relieve some of the burden now born by taxpayers and black single mothers.
